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Background: Policy initiatives and technological advances enable the use of integrated shared care models of
healthcare delivery whereby the focus of care is moved from the hospital to the community, and also of models
where patients take increasing responsibility for monitoring and treatment. Such shifts may or may be perceived
to change professional roles and responsibilities with implications to the delivery of a professionally and legally
acceptable standard of care. We focus on oral anticoagulation and stroke prevention therapy to examine some
possible professional and legal implications of the increasing use of shared care.
Methods: This paper sought to explore how changes in service delivery influence the discharge of professional
responsibilities to patients receiving oral anti-coagulation therapy in the context of clinicians’ legal and professional
duties. We used a case study of the implementation of a distributed care anti-coagulation service. Qualitative data
were collected using complementary methods: participant observation, reflective journaling and legal analysis.
Results: Concerns identified by this study included a fear of litigation among both hospital and community-based
professionals, a reluctance to embrace an extended role, uncertainty among professionals about the extent of their
responsibilities and associated difficulties around adequate exchanges of information. These concerns reflected
uncertainty among professionals about the legal and professional scope of the duty of care they owed patients.
Conclusion: The findings from this study emphasise the importance of clear role definition, communication and
inter-agency cooperation for the successful implementation of a shared care service in which threats to professional
and legal standards of care are minimised.
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The rapidly increasing complexity of healthcare has ne-
cessarily been accompanied by a commensurate need for
more collaboration and sharing of information between
healthcare professionals and across healthcare settings.
Increasingly, health policy initiatives encourage physi-
cians to move care from the hospital setting closer to
the patient as part of a response to the need to provide
sustainable, well-coordinated care for people with long-
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unless otherwise stated.The challenge such initiatives face is to provide clinical
and service-level integration that focuses on how care
can be better provided around the needs of individuals,
especially where this care is being given by a number of
different professionals and organisations [1]. High func-
tioning inter-professional sharing and collaboration is
essential to the success of integrated, healthcare delivery
[2,3]. Yet, the difficulties of achieving and maintaining
successful high-functioning teams are well documented.
As Freeman et al. explain there is considerable variability
in professionals’ understanding of what constitutes mul-
tiprofessional working especially in relation to commu-
nication and understanding of the professional role [2].
A facet of integrated care that has been somewhat
neglected concerns the traditional way in which a patientl. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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his/her care. This has meant that patients initially see the
physician who entrusts others to provide various services
whilst retaining overall responsibility for care. Indeed this
is the position supported by the legal principle of the non-
delegable duty of care. Yet this sits uneasily with many
physicians and allied healthcare professionals as they strive
to deliver high quality care within their designated profes-
sional scope whilst confining themselves to practicing only
in areas in which they are competent to practice. As a re-
sult although integrated shared care initiatives are usually
welcomed by patients, physicians and other health care
professionals may be reluctant to participate due to uncer-
tainty about what it might entail, how they fit into the in-
tegrated system and associated fear of increased liability
and vulnerability to litigation [4,5]. Such concerns are
understandable in the increasingly litigious context of
healthcare.
As a case study we consider oral anticoagulation and
stroke prevention therapy (OASPT). This is a mainstay of
the prevention of stroke in an increasing number of ‘at
risk’ patients, principally using warfarin. Oral anticoagula-
tion and stroke prevention therapy aims to reduce the risk
of a thromboembolic event by maintaining patients at the
optimum level of anticoagulation without producing an
unacceptable risk of haemorrhage. Although the provision
of OASPT has traditionally been through hospital-based
services the increase in clinical need [6-8] has led to the
development of a variety of models for delivering care.
This includes schemes in which patients may attend com-
munity pharmacies or nurse-led clinics at GP surgeries for
the routine monitoring and adjustment of their OASPT or
the patient may self-test or self-manage.
There have been many examples of shared care devel-
oped over the last decades. Some such as antenatal shared
care have been in existence for many years and the roles
and responsibilities have been well defined. In contrast,
anticoagulant and stroke preventions services, which bear
the characteristics of many long-term conditions, have
risks and complexities which are very difficult to manage
safely and require very different approaches. The particu-
lar issues that present major issues that challenge conven-
tional approaches include: the narrow therapeutic range of
the anticoagulant drugs; the effects of diet and other drugs
such as antibiotics and analgesics on oral anticoagulant
drugs. As a result the oral anticoagulant itself can cause
harm and death. However the benefit in terms of prevent-
ing stroke is substantial but the medication must be taken
on a regular basis, the population is usually elderly, and
many patients have multiple co-morbidities with associ-
ated changing medication regimes and involvement of
many different healthcare professionals.
Most of the emergent models in OASPT involve a shift
of service delivery from a traditional hospital outpatientsetting to community settings and many harness electronic
support. Such models are premised on a fundamentally
new patient experience that is unconstrained by familiar
points of engagement with healthcare or traditional
channels for delivering information or care. Expanding
a hospital-based service into a community-based service
requires health care professionals in both settings to as-
sume different responsibilities for patient care and, at
the same time, some patients may take a more active
role in their care. Allied to these changes are potential
changes to the risks to healthcare quality and, therefore,
to the way in which professional practice should be de-
fined. Further exploration of specific changes in service
delivery is required to assess how well-founded these con-
cerns are and to shed light on the potential risks and di-
mensions of liability raised by a shift from hospital to
community-delivered and hospital-supported care.
This paper makes a preliminary attempt to explore
how changes in the service delivery of an oral anticoagu-




The site of the service discussed in this paper is in North
Central London (NCL). The service aims to improve pa-
tient access to safe and effective OASTP. Optimised pre-
scription requires an individual drug regime to avoid both
under-coagulation leading to the risk of stroke and over-
coagulation leading to the risk of haemorrhage. The
scheme relies on remote access to a computerised decision
support system (DSS) developed by a consultant cardiolo-
gist, and an associated electronic health record. The DSS
records the clotting characteristics of a patient’s blood,
and is complemented by an electronic record that enables
prescribers to have access to relevant and current informa-
tion concerning the patient; this is particularly important
in the context of ACT given multiple potential drug inter-
actions. The use of computerised predictive packages
means that the recommended doses are within the same
limits of accuracy as those suggested by experienced doc-
tors, so that the service can be delivered by an appropri-
ately trained nurse or pharmacist. This development,
together with the increasing availability of portable, reli-
able and easy-to-use coagulometers, facilitated the devel-
opment of novel forms of service delivery.
This service is an established integrated care service
that embraces hospital outpatient departments and over
35 community sites. Several different models of service
delivery operate. In some cases, primary care staff –
community pharmacists, GPs or practice nurses – run
community-based clinics. In other cases, there is an out-
reach service whereby pharmacists or nurses from the base
hospital, run community-based clinics. Other patients
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patient’s coagulation status there are six key roles: patient
education in the use of an anticoagulant; initiation of a pa-
tient onto warfarin; testing and monitoring a patient’s co-
agulation status; dose adjustment and prescribing. These
roles may be shared variably by healthcare professionals in
different service models. In some circumstances patients
may take responsibility for self-testing or self-managing.
Key organisational features include a Clinical Governance
Board that brings together professionals from different dis-
ciplines and multiple organisations: cardiology, haematol-
ogy, hospital and community pharmacists, GPs, managers
and commissioners, patient representatives, researchers
and other experts. The service also provides compulsory,
assessed training for anticoagulant practitioners running
clinics and has explicit Clinical Standard Operating Proce-
dures to which all delivery sites should perform.Legal analysis
We carried out a legal analysis of issues that arose from a
range of data collection activities. The legal analysis used a
combination of rule-based reasoning based on the estab-
lished principles of the law of negligence and precedent
analysis where parallels might be drawn between the facts
presented here and previously decided cases. A search of
the literature was conducted using the following databases
Westlaw, Medline, CINAHL, Lexis, and BAILII. Key search
terms identified were standard of care, professional negli-
gence, duty of care, breach, consent, delegation, service
models, shared care, distributed care.
As a way of focusing the legal analysis, we created case
vignettes. These are fictional to preserve anonymity, but
are based on one or more real incidents and on concerns
raised by staff. The vignettes and this paper generally are
not intended to be statistically representative of adverse
events, problems or other issues that arose in the ser-
vice. Rather, the vignettes were created and selected to
illustrate a range of issues we encountered.Data collection
The issues identified for the legal analysis arose in the con-
text of a broader series of studies of the service beginning
in 2006. Full details of the data collection methods used in
those studies have previously been reported [9-12].
In particular, participant observation, reflective jour-
naling and a review of selected cases which caused pro-
fessional anxiety and concern and of cases involving
adverse events were used to explore the professional
concerns and approaches of team members to the dis-
tributed service. DP and BC work as clinicians in the
service, seeing patients and supervising junior staff and
JN is also part of the Clinical Governance Board provid-
ing a legal perspective.Throughout this work and in the prior studies, we
sought close co-operation between researchers and ser-
vice staff in a spirit of the co-production of knowledge,
[13] with research findings continuously fed back to the
clinical and software teams. This co-production ap-
proach, we believe, better captures the reality of what
happens in a complex clinical service, but we recognise
that it can also bring biases. We do not purport to have
necessarily captured all the implications of shared care
or to be able to say how frequently different implications
occur. Rather, we have used the data collection to pro-
duce a set of problems for the legal analysis.
Participant observation
Researchers were participant observers at meetings from
2006 onwards, both of a formal and an informal nature,
involving service staff (clinical and administrative) and/or
researchers. Informal, unstructured conversations and in-
terviews were carried out with the clinical team and other
healthcare professionals in the local health ecosystem.
Field notes were made as soon as possible after these.
The most significant formal meetings were of the Clin-
ical Governance Board (CGB), which met regularly, ap-
proximately twice a year. Membership of the board is
diverse, with those attending typically numbering around
20, and includes clinical (pharmacist, medical, nursing)
and administrative service staff, clinical staff from other
services, the software team, commissioners, researchers
and patient representatives. All the authors have been on
the board. Also significant were training and education
events for anticoagulant practitioners. These were ap-
proximately biannual, and were also attended by patient
representatives and members of the research team. They
were larger than CGB meetings with around 70 attendees.
The most significant informal meetings were between the
clinical and software team. Where possible, meetings or
conversations were held after significant events, e.g. nego-
tiations around the service extending to a new site, a
major critical incident or after CGB meetings.
We also had access to a range of documents which were
analysed. These included: the Standard Operating Procedure
for the service (in various different versions), materials con-
sidered at and minutes of the CGB, and Department of
Health literature pertaining to anticoagulation.
Reflective journaling
JN and HP kept reflective journals over several years,
during the course of the multiple studies mentioned,
covering any issues that seemed pertinent. Issues were
then discussed with the other authors on a regular basis.
Case studies creating concern among clinicians
In addition to discussing general concerns at the CGB
meetings, professionals were actively encouraged by the
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of exemplar cases creating anxiety. Critical incidents
were also identified in cooperation with the clinical
team. Cases and incidents were initially reported by both
primary and secondary healthcare professionals running
the service either formally at the CGB meetings and/or
directly to the Consultant in charge of the service or to
members of the hospital-based service. The CGB meet-
ings and informal discussions with various staff revealed
some potential areas of concern. Additional research ac-
tivities were specifically aimed at risk management
[11-13] and also informed the work presented here.
Ethics
This study constituted an audit or service evaluation and
therefore no ethics approval was needed from the NHS
Research Ethics Committee, as discussed with the local
R&D office. This study was exempt from approval by the
UCL Ethics Committee as constituting an audit. We
drew on a range of previous studies [9-12]: ethical ap-
proval was gained from the local research ethics com-
mittee for the collection of data which did not fall
within the remit of service evaluation.
Results and discussion
The vignettes presented here are informed by several
years work within the oral anticoagulation and stroke
prevention therapy service. They are not intended as re-
sults, rather it is hoped that they are recognizable as
‘real’ and typical of situations that arise in shared care.
As these situations increasingly arise in shared care
models of service delivery, what then are the potential
medico-legal implications? The results are the legal ana-
lysis of the vignettes. We begin by considering how the
principles of legal negligence might apply.
The law of negligence
Professional responsibility – the legal basis governing
professional duties and standards of care.
Duty of care - negligence and the scope of professional
responsibility
Patients in the NHS expect the law to protect them from
potential harm from negligent practitioners by establishing
stringent requirements of high levels of professional prac-
tice. When things go wrong they expect legal consequences
to attach to the health care professional. Furthermore, pa-
tients expect the law to embrace not only individual practi-
tioners but the whole healthcare system so that individual
components combine to optimise their health. Profes-
sionals’ concerns in relation to litigation are grounded in
their appreciation of the legal duty of care which they owe
to their patients which is, in turn, reinforced by professional
Codes of Practice. This is complemented by a statutoryduty of quality imposed on all Clinical Commissioning
Groups (CCG) (and formerly on all NHS and Primary Care
Trusts) by the Health & Social Care Act (2012) [14].
The law of negligence is the legal device used to give
effect to the common law duty of care. It is based on the
existence of a duty of care between two or more parties.
When this duty is breached and the breach causes harm,
a claim for negligence may arise. Most medical negli-
gence claims are based on breach of the common law
duty of care although if a patient is harmed through the
negligent conduct of a healthcare professional, other
consequences may follow, for example, rarely, criminal
prosecution or professional disciplinary proceedings.
The existence of a duty of care is normally easily
established. The basic rule is that you owe a duty of care
to anyone you may foreseeably injure. Thus, hospital
staff owe a duty of care to patients in hospital and GPs
owe a duty of care to patients on their lists. In the con-
text of this service, there are several potential categories
of people who owe a duty of care to a patient:
a) any of the involved medical professionals
individually – cardiologists, haematologists, hospital
pharmacists, community pharmacists, GP;
b) any of the employers of those professionals, may
also be vicariously liable, i.e. independent
pharmacies, GPs, NHS Trusts, Clinical
Commissioning Groups;
c) the provider unit directly – CCG, independent
pharmacies, GPs, NHS Trusts
Legal claims are most commonly brought against a Trust,
which is legally responsible for the negligence of its em-
ployees either through the device of vicarious liability or as
a result of a hospital’s non-delegable duty to its patients
[15]. However, it is worth commenting further on the less
commonly raised issue of direct liability referred to under
(c) above. In this situation the claim would be that the pro-
viders themselves were negligent, for example, by failing to
provide adequate numbers of suitably trained staff [16].
Thus, no individual professional might be held negligent
but the provider itself could be. Other examples might be if
there were no proper procedures to check that equipment
was working properly or that staff were properly kept up to
date with medical developments [17].
The usual test for negligence is the well-established
Bolam test [18] which states that, ‘a doctor is not guilty
of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a prac-
tice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical
men skilled in that particular art’. The test applies to all
healthcare workers and despite much debate has been
approved in the House of Lords [19-22]. Although the
courts are yet to fully consider the question, it seems
that when considering whether a trust has been directly
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e. a trust will not necessarily have a defence just because
they are acting at a level other hospitals act at, if the
judge decides those standards to be unreasonable [23].
Applying this to the outreach model(s) of OATSP ser-
vice delivery suggests that the existence and use of dis-
tributed OATSP models elsewhere may, in itself, be
unlikely to assist a provider unit in its defence of any
claim, an issue which we found to be of concern to
commissioners.
In relation to the hospital-based anticoagulation service
it is self-evident that the consultant owes a legal and pro-
fessional duty of care to all patients under the care of the
service. It is equally uncontroversial that each of the partici-
pating healthcare professionals - nurses, pharmacists, GPs -
owes a legal and professional duty of care to their patients.
Similarly, in the outreach setting, all healthcare profes-
sionals, including the consultant in charge of the service,
owe a legal and professional duty of care to their patients.
A recurrent finding was that almost all community-based
practitioners felt anxious about assuming this duty and un-
sure of its scope. In parallel, from the perspective of the
consultant leading the service, the question that recurred
was to what extent he remained liable for the actions of
colleagues in the community. It is these issues which we
consider next.
Legally, our starting point is that the duty of care is
non-delegable [15], so a key question raised was, what is
the extent of the consultant’s duty and how may this be
met in practical terms? Similarly, what is the scope of
the duty owed by GPs, nurse practitioners and commu-
nity pharmacists? These concerns highlighted the need
to explicate the duties, roles and responsibilities of other
team members but how does current law assist us?
In relation to the delegation of care to community-
based professionals, although required to ensure that the
professionals to whom care is delegated are competent
[24,25], the hospital consultant retains overall responsibil-
ity. In principle, delegation could be deemed negligent if,
for example, the consultant failed to take reasonable steps
to ensure that the delegees are appropriately qualified and
trained. However, delegation is a two-way process and the
professional delegee, be they GP, nurse or pharmacist, has
a professionally imposed duty to practice only within
spheres in which they are competent. Hence, if an instruc-
tion seems blatantly wrong, it is incumbent on a health
care professional not to follow it, a position which was
confirmed by two cases in which a pharmacist who failed
to seek confirmation of a prescription that was patently
wrong was found to be negligent [26,27].
To address the legal and professional requirements to
ensure that delegees are adequately trained a central plank
of this service is an assessed training programme that all
practitioners are required to complete satisfactorily. Theprogramme is subject to rigorous review and is comple-
mented by ongoing follow-up procedures and audit
checks. We found that the programme received over-
whelmingly positive feedback from almost all participants.
Yet, at the same time many of the same practitioners still
voiced strong concerns about the scope of their responsi-
bility and were reluctant to fully embrace their expanded
role.
Shared care: a series of case vignettes
In order to explore the dimensions of the concerns raised
we will use a series of case vignettes. These are con-
structed case studies based on an amalgam of real life situ-
ations which were reported by professionals within NCL
as being a source of concern.
Case vignette - shared care - unrelated medical admission
to hospital – community interaction
John is a 72 year old retired civil servant. He has
active cancer and has suffered recurrent pulmonary
emboli and so needs ongoing warfarin therapy. He has
been taking warfarin for several years and is managed
by the community service. He was admitted to hospital
for unrelated reasons. He was discharged from
hospital but no discharge summary was provided. The
community service received a letter from a recent
out-patient appointment indicating only that ‘the
hospital’ had stopped the patient’s warfarin when John
was an in-patient. Telephone calls to the hospital
failed to clarify the situation meaning that the
community service had to resort to asking the patient
for details of his medication status.
John’s case highlights the risks that present when there
is inadequate communication between hospital and
community providers. Clearly the hospital has a legal
and professional responsibility to provide adequate dis-
charge information to ensure that John is discharged
safely. But John’s case raises interesting questions: how
far should the community service be expected to go in
tracking information? whose responsibility is it to ensure
continuity of care of his warfarin management and how
acceptable is it to be relying on a patient’s report of
medication changes?
Case vignette – shared care with social services
involvement
Eleanor is a lady in her eighties with mild dementia,
COPD and recurrent PE. Her mobility is limited and
she requires constant portable oxygen. She is visited by
the community anti-coagulation service every 2-3
weeks. Following hospital admission for a chest
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or any of the community staff. A week post-discharge,
when the healthcare assistant visited to do a routine
check, Eleanor was found to be under-coagulated. She
was sure that the hospital had taken her off warfarin
and told her not to take any more. She was unsure
which ward she was in and could not remember the
names of any of the staff. The GP was unaware of the
situation as no discharge summary had been provided
and there was no written record. The community
pharmacist contacted the hospital and, following
several frustrating attempts to obtain the correct
information, the hospital said that the patient’s warfarin
had not in fact been stopped but that no discharge
summary had been sent because ‘pharmacy had not
approved it’.
Eleanor’s case provides a further illustration of the diffi-
culties that can ensue when information isn’t shared be-
tween all those with responsibility for a patient’s care.
Eleanor’s situation was further confounded by the involve-
ment of a healthcare assistant whose role, by definition,
meant that she was unable to adjust Eleanor’s warfarin
dose. Unlike John in our previous vignette, Eleanor was
not able to assist the professionals involved, leading to in-
evitable frustration and anxiety reflected in this comment
made by a nurse practitioner,
‘I don’t know how we manage these sorts of incidents
because where does the responsibility lie’
Case vignette – GP failing to consider OASTP
concerns/community OASTP axis
William is a 69 year old ex-postman on warfarin who
is described in medical notes as “not too stable” and
suffers frequent nose bleeds. Following two particularly
lengthy nosebleeds he telephoned the community antic-
oagulation service (ACS) who advised him to keep his
warfarin dose unchanged. Over the subsequent 5 days
William had some smaller nosebleeds and elected
(without advice) to miss some of his doses of warfarin.
His GP started him on an anti-infective for his nose
bleeds which he had had before but did not counsel
him in relation to warfarin, nor inform the ACS. The
nosebleeds persisted and William continued to dose
himself erratically. William attended the ACS and was
found to be severely undercoagulated; he was advised
to keep taking his warfarin and to inform the service
of any further missed doses. The anticoagulation ser-
vice wrote to the GP requesting a review of the appro-
priateness of warfarin for this patient bearing in mind
any co-morbidities and his social situation, but re-
ceived no reply and no indication that such a reviewhad happened. Subsequently the GP admitted that he
did not think he should ‘interfere’ with the warfarin.
William’s case illustrates the threats to safety that can
occur when different professionals do not operate from
a shared, practical understanding of their respective
roles. Combined with patients who may be panicked or
frightened the potential for the standard of care to fall
below what is acceptable is evident. The idea that by not
‘interfering’ a clinician somehow absolves him/herself of
professional responsibility is clearly untenable. Despite
this it was a recurring theme frequently occurring in the
guise of clinicians not wanting to involve themselves in
‘specialist’ care even at the most basic level despite the
risk to a patient of becoming seriously under or overcoa-
gulated. In the risk context it is interesting to remind
ourselves of the case of Marriott v West Midlands HA
[28] in which a GP visited a patient who had suffered a
fall and prescribed painkillers but did not suggest a full
neurological examination as the risk of a brain clot was
small. Despite the small risks the court deemed this to
be negligent on the basis of the potential severity of the
consequences to the patient if a clot existed.
Case vignettes – GP failing to consider the ‘over-responsible’
and ‘under-responsible’ patients
Bob is an 83 year old retired driver who lives with his
wife who is his main carer. He has been taking
warfarin for atrial fibrillation for more than 5 years
and is managed by the community ACS. Bob
developed a chest infection and was seen by his GP at
home. His GP observed an abdominal lump with
surface bruising and provisionally diagnoses an
abdominal haematoma so referred Bob to the hospital
for a blood test and an ultrasound. However he did
not notify the ACS nor discuss anti-coagulation with
Bob. The ultrasound showed that Bob had two abdom-
inal haematomas and, only at that stage, was he re-
ferred to the ACS for urgent review.
It is unequivocal that a patient who presented to a GP
with symptoms prompting a provisional diagnosis of sus-
pected abdominal haematoma should have been referred to
the OASTP service, rather than for a limited set of investi-
gations which ignored their anticoagulation status. Bob’s
case echoes the case of William as again the failure to refer
Bob to the anticoagulation service in a timely fashion ap-
peared to reflect the GP’s concern about ‘getting involved’,
despite the fact that failure to refer at an appropriate time,
bearing in mind the risks involved, has been regarded as
evidence of negligence [28]. However, could it be argued
that the relatively uncommon nature of a diagnosis of ab-
dominal haematoma made it reasonable in a Bolam sense
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nosis was confirmed?
GP’s working outwith an anticoagulation service have, of
course, always managed patients on warfarin. However, as
both William’s and Bob’s cases illustrate, some GPs and
other community professionals appeared uncertain as to
how the system operated overall and behaved in ways
which indicated a sub-optimal understanding of their role,
leading to occasions when claims of sub-standard care
would appear to be legitimate. Investigating these sorts of
system failures further, we found that the Standard Oper-
ating Protocol was silent on the role that a GP working
outwith this service should play in community-based
OASTP service. This could be viewed as an oversight in
relation to any claim for negligence on the part of the pro-
vider. Equally, the Service Specifications considered com-
munications initiated by the patient or the anticoagulation
practitioner but did not explicitly address the scenario of a
GP needing to initiate contact, leaving the matter of when
to instigate communication to an individual GP’s profes-
sional judgment.
Case vignettes – the ‘over-responsible’ and ‘under-responsible’
patients
Edward is a retired molecular biologist who receives
warfarin as part of the management of atrial
fibrillation. His target INR is in the range 2-3. Edward
has mild osteopenia and has fallen on two occasions.
He is anxious about the possibility of fracturing his
hip. He has extensively researched the scientific evi-
dence concerning possible relationships between vita-
min K levels and fracture and management of his
stroke risk. As a result he has concluded that he wishes
to reduce his target INR.
David is a 70 year old man who has taken warfarin
for 5 years and has been self-testing for the last 2. As a
result of becoming undercoagulated he has, in the past,
suffered recurrent thrombi in his heart. Consequently
the ACS sends him regular reminders to phone in his
INR test results but he fails to do so unless something
goes wrong.
An essential part of warfarin therapy involves ensuring
that patients are able to co-operate with their care. Whereas
some patients struggle to understand their role, other pa-
tients are keen to manage their care themselves to the extent
of becoming responsible for either self- management or self-
testing. Although the move away from paternalistic models
of care towards collaborative models in which decision-
making is shared between patient and professional has beenwidely promoted by policy initiatives [29,30] we found many
practitioners were very anxious about where responsibility
lay when a patient was required to take more responsibility
in practice. Edward and David reflect a growing contingent
of informed patients who wish to be more involved in mak-
ing clinical decisions about their care. When these decisions
are contrary to the judgment of the clinician it raises the
issue of where does legal liability fall. A strongly recurrent
theme amongst clinicians was that that by responding to the
clamour of voices urging for patients autonomy to be
respected, they were caught in a no-win situation, making
them responsible if things went wrong irrespective of the ac-
tions, however unwise, taken by a patient.
Common issues
Overall, participants in this study expressed concern over
the possibility of sub-standard care being offered and a pro-
found fear of litigation. In broad terms, our findings fit into
two overlapping categories: those related to professionals’
concerns about the scope of their role as individuals and
those related to inter-professional and inter-agency com-
munication across organisational boundaries.
Often patients on warfarin are admitted to hospital for
an unrelated reason and we found some evidence of failure
to provide adequate discharge information leading to a fail-
ure to ensure safe continuation of warfarin therapy on dis-
charge from hospital. Safety is further undermined by
uncertainty amongst the community professionals as to
where responsibility lies. It is these sorts of situations that
we suspect underlie the finding that GPs repeatedly re-
ported, that of feeling undereducated in anticoagulation is-
sues, despite receiving comprehensive training from the
Hospital Trust. This concern may have arisen from an
awareness among GPs that, legally, inexperience is no de-
fence to failure to provide an acceptable standard of care
[31,32]. A very real concern voiced by GPs appears to
centre on concerns regarding failure to recognise the need
for specialist support and being vulnerable to a claim of
negligence for failing to refer appropriately. Under negli-
gence law, the GP’s actions would be assessed by reference
to the skills expected of a GP trained in oral anticoagula-
tion therapy, not those of a cardiologist [33]. This makes
the reluctance of the GPs more surprising as whereas a GP
might not be deemed negligent in failing to know how to
manage the warfarin s(he) could be deemed negligent for
failing to refer the patient to the anti-coagulation service.
Shared care between hospital and community pro-
viders offers benefits to patients, but only if there is
close collaboration and cooperation between the partici-
pating teams. As discussed above, this study revealed
communication failures between different elements of
the service, reflected at the patient and professional level
by professional role ambiguity and failure to understand
how different parts of the service fitted together. Hence,
Nicholls et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:93 Page 8 of 9we found evidence of community practitioners failing to
follow-up referrals to the hospital anticoagulation clinic
and, conversely, some evidence of casual importance being
accorded by hospital accident & emergency departments
to ‘urgent’ information concerning a patient whose anti-
coagulant status was volatile. More disappointingly, we
found suggestion of a lack of co-operation at an organisa-
tional level resulting in, for example, evidence of insuffi-
cient information being transferred between hospital staff
who considered that once they had discharged a patient
they had no further responsibility to provide information to
a patient’s GP about the patient’s anti-coagulation status.
The need to clarify roles in the system of delivering war-
farin therapy has been highlighted previously [34]. Al-
though, we could find no case law considering the legal
liability of teams working across different geographical
sites, the court has held that the way that a team of hos-
pital doctors worked together produced a negligent level
of care and in that case, the team leader was found to be
negligent in having inadequately trained his team [35]. In
relation to this service, it may be that the cross-site team-
working could also provide a basis for a negligence action.
The emphasis in clinical governance terms is on risk man-
agement at an individual clinician-patient level which
highlighted a requirement for training to address the man-
agement of the risks of the wider team context within
which the OASTP service is provided.
In many areas of tort law a claiming party who is
found to have contributed in some way to their situation
may be found to have been contributorily negligent and
the remedies applied are adjusted appropriately to reflect
this contribution. Traditionally, in healthcare law such a
defence of contributory negligence by which some legal
responsibility could be attributed to a patient has not
been used. This reluctance presumably reflects the pa-
ternalistic model of clinician-patient relationship which
has traditionally underpinned healthcare.
A successful legal claim for negligence requires not
only that a duty of care is breached but also that the
breach caused the harm suffered. In practice causation is
tested by the ‘but for’ test so that ‘but for’ the alleged
failure, the claiming party would not have suffered harm.
In other words there is a direct link between an action
and the harm suffered. On a paternalistic view of health-
care the main actor is the doctor or healthcare profes-
sional and the assumption is that the patient is adopting
a passive ‘recipient’ role which absolves him of any real
responsibility and, in a legal sense, means that his con-
duct cannot interfere with the chain of causation. It is
curious that contributory negligence continues to be so
rarely asserted. Yet, increasingly, as patients take more
responsibility for their care it is questionable whether it
remains appropriate to assume that patients’ actions
cannot break the chain of causation.In the UK we found only one clinical negligence case
in which a successful defence was mounted on the basis
of contributory negligence [36]. The case involved a pa-
tient whose cervical smear test was negligently reported
as negative in 1988. In the following decade the patient
was repeatedly advised to undergo further smear tests;
she refused as she found the procedure painful and
embarassing. She was diagnosed with cervical carcinoma
in 1998 and claimed for negligence. Part of the defen-
dant’s case was that the claimant’s behaviour had inter-
fered with the chain of causation. The judge agreed and
the claimant was found to be two thirds responsible.
The basis for the judgment was largely pragmatic with
little detailed judicial consideration of the underlying
legal principles and so it is difficult for us to extrapolate
to the situations faced by clinicians managing self-caring
patients on warfarin.
Conclusion
Extending a hospital-based anti-coagulation and stroke
prevention service into different models of a community-
based service requires health care professionals in both
settings to assume different responsibilities for patient out-
comes & quality of care. Consonant with this are potential
changes to the risks to healthcare quality and to the way
in which an acceptable standard of care is defined. These
reflect a general problem of defining complex conduct
prospectively, that of how to establish risk spreading and
how to establish knowable standards of legal conduct.
Alongside this problem remains the issue that physicians
who are interested in promoting shared integrated care
are concerned that shared responsibility with fellow pro-
fessionals or patients does not at present mean shared li-
ability. While these uncertainties remain, changes in ways
of delivering services are likely to generate professional
concerns about roles and responsibilities which may only
partially be mitigated by stringent clinical governance
procedures.
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